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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1324 
 ___________ 
 
 ADRIAN MARK JARRETT, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No. A039-746-263) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 20, 2012 
 Before:  JORDAN, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 







 Adrian Mark Jarrett petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the 
following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Jarrett, a citizen of Jamaica, was admitted into the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in 1985.  In 1993, he pleaded guilty in the New Jersey Superior Court, 
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Middlesex County, to the distribution of cocaine in violation of  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-
5(b)(3).  In 2005, he was convicted by a jury in the New Jersey Superior Court, Somerset 
County, for possession of PCP in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-10(a)(1).  He was 
placed in removal proceedings pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien convicted of a controlled 
substance violation.  Jarrett admitted to his convictions, and applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 
 Jarrett and his father testified at a hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  
Jarrett’s father testified that he had owned a minibus business.  He stated that his business 
competitors, who had ties to the Jamaican police, continuously harassed him and in 1982, 
he was beaten by the police.  As a result of the harassment, Jarrett’s father left Jamaica, 
and eventually sold his business.  Jarrett testified that one day, when he was nine, the bus 
he was riding broke down.  His father’s business competitors came to pick up a couple of 
kids, but one of the competitors looked at him “like he wanted to hurt [him].”  Jarrett was 
not allowed on the competitor’s bus and had to walk home.  Jarrett testified that after that 
incident, “nothing else really happened.”  Jarrett also testified that he had returned to 
Jamaica around 1986 with his mother and siblings, and no one was harmed.  Jarrett’s 
father testified that he had returned to Jamaica around five times without experiencing 
any harassment.  Nevertheless, Jarrett stated that he fears that the minibus competitors 
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and police who had harassed his father will harm him if he returns to Jamaica.  He also 
believed that he would be mistreated as a deportee and because he is “Americanized.” 
 The IJ found Jarrett removable as charged.  The IJ determined that Jarrett’s 1993 
conviction was an aggravated felony, and therefore Jarrett was ineligible for asylum.  She 
also determined that the conviction was presumptively a “particularly serious crime,” and 
therefore denied withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B) and the CAT.  Finally, she denied Jarrett’s request for deferral of 
removal under the CAT.  Jarrett appealed, arguing that he qualified for CAT relief, and 
for the first time claimed that he was as a supporter of “RPG,” which he described as a 
targeted group.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) affirmed the 
denial of asylum and withholding of removal, noting that Jarrett did not contest that he 
was convicted of an aggravated felony that also qualifies a particularly serious crime.  
The Board also affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, agreeing with 
the IJ that he had not established a clear probability of torture based on his and his 
father’s experiences in Jamaica, or as an Americanized Jamaican, deportee, or supporter 
of “RPG.” 
 Jarrett filed a pro se petition for review.  He argues that he was not convicted of an 
aggravated felony,  that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the 
immigration consequences of pleading guilty, that an aggravated felony conviction does 
not bar him from asylum relief, and that he qualifies for relief under the CAT. The 
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Government has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which a motions panel 
referred to this merits panel. 
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to INA § 242(a), 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We, however, lack jurisdiction to review Jarrett’s claims that he was 
not convicted of an aggravated felony,
1
 that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform 
him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, and that an aggravated felony 
conviction does not bar him from asylum relief, because he failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies as to these claims.  Prior to seeking review in this Court, an alien 
must “exhaust[ ] all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”  INA 
§ 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  This requires an alien to raise each claim or ground 
for relief in his appeal to the Board.  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  Jarrett raised only the issue of whether he qualified for CAT relief before the 
BIA.  Therefore, these claims are not properly before us. 
Because Jarrett was convicted of an aggravated felony and controlled substance 
violation, our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law.  INA 
§ 242(a)(2)(C), (D); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  Thus, to the extent that Jarrett argues 
that the BIA erred in determining “what is likely to happen to the [him] if removed[,]” we 
                                                 
1
Jarrett argues specifically that his conviction for possession with intent to 
distribute a controlled dangerous substance near a school in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:35-7 does not constitute an aggravated felony.  Assuming he was convicted of that 




cannot review this claim.  See Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).  
To the extent, however, that Jarrett challenges the BIA’s application of the law governing 
CAT protection to the undisputed facts of record, we have jurisdiction to review the 
claim, Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 412 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006), and will reject it on 
the merits.  The facts concerning what is likely to happen to Jarrett, as determined by the 
Board, do not establish that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if removed 
to Jamaica.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  The BIA determined that the harassment 
Jarrett’s father experienced from former competitors and police and the incident in which 
one of Jarrett’s father’s competitors looked at him “like he wanted to hurt [Jarrett]” were 
remote, and noted that Jarrett and his father have returned to Jamaica without 
experiencing any harm.  The Board also noted that the record does not indicate that 
members of “RPG,” deportees, or “Americanized” Jamaicans have been or would be 
targeted.  Thus, we conclude that the BIA properly determined that the evidence Jarrett 
presented about what is likely to happen to him if removed to Jamaica did not meet the 
legal definition of torture.  See Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 271. 
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  The Government’s motion to 
dismiss is denied. 
